关键词：网络物理安全；资源配置；游戏；应用程序
摘 要：We consider a three-step three-player complete information Colonel Blotto game in this paper, in which the rst two players ght against a common adversary. Each player is endowed with certain amount of resources at the beginning of the game, and the number of battle elds on which a player and the adversary ghts is speci ed. The rst two players are allowed to form a coalition if it improves their payo s. In the rst stage, the rst two players may add battle elds and incur costs. In the second stage, the rst two players may transfer resources among each other. The adversary observes this transfer, and decides on the allocation of its resources to the two battles with the players.at the third step, the adversary and the other two players ght on the updated number of battle elds and receive payo s. We characterize the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the game in various parameter regions. In particular, we show that there are certain parameter regions in which if the players act according to the SPNE strategies, then (i) one of the rst two players add battle elds and transfer resources to the other player (a coalition is formed), (ii) there is no addition of battle elds and no transfer of resources (no coalition is formed). We discuss the implications of the results on resource allocation for securing cyber physical systems.