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PHANTOM:安全处理器中的实用性健忘路由算法

PHANTOM: Practical Oblivious Computation in a Secure Processor

作者:Martin Maas 作者单位:EECS Department, University of California, Berkeley 加工时间:2015-04-18 信息来源:EECS 索取原文[87 页]
关键词:安全处理器;Oblivious路由;ORAM
摘 要:Although secure processors encrypt all data as it leaves the CPU, the memory addresses that are being accessed in DRAM are still transmitted in plaintext on the address bus. This represents an important source of information leakage that enables serious attacks that can, in the worst case, leak bits of cryptographic keys. To counter such attacks, we introduce PHANTOM, a new secure processor that obfuscates its memory access trace. To an adversary who can observe the processor's output pins, all memory access traces are computationally indistinguishable (a property known as obliviousness). We achieve obliviousness through a cryptographic construct known as Oblivious RAM (ORAM).
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